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RECENT DECISIONS
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DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION INHERITANCE THROUGH ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD IowA STATUTE This action involved a determination of the

heirs of .d, a widow, whose deceased husband, B, was an illegitimate child.
Three sets of claimants asked for her estate: the legitimate descendants of B's
mother, the legitimate descendants of B's father, and the state of Iowa, the
domicile of the deceased. The district court awarded the property to the state,
as uninherited property, on the ground that the other claimants could not take
through an illegitimate. On appeal, reversed. An Iowa statute 1 provided that
an illegitimate child could inherit from his mother, and from his father, when
recognized in a certain manner, and also provided that his mother, and his
father, if recognized, could inherit from such illegitimate. The conclusion of the
court was that this statute should be construed to provide for more than mutual
inheritance between illegitimates and their parents; it means that an illegitimate's
blood is inheritable and next of kin can claim through him. Therefore, the
descendants of B's mother were awarded one-half the estate, and, since the court
found the proper recognition between B and his father, the descendants of B's
father took the other half. In re Clark's Estate, (Iowa, 1940) 290 N. W. 13.
Two aspects of this case are worth noting: ( 1 ) the broad construction of
the Iowa statute governing inheritance by and from illegitimate persons, and
( 2) the manner in which the statutory recognition of the father was satisfied.
The Iowa statute abolished the common-law rule that illegitimate offspring
could inherit from nobody and could have neither collateral heirs nor lineal
ascendants capable of taking by inheritance. 2 The statute adopts what is said to be
the civil-law rule that an illegitimate child can inherit from his mother and
she from him. 8 Prior to the principal case this statute had been extended by
judicial construction to permit the child of an illegitimate parent to inherit
through the illegitimate parent from the ancestor of the parent in cases in which
the child could represent its illegitimate parent. 4 But the question had been left
1. "Illegitimate children inherit from their mother, and she from them. They
shall inherit from the father when the paternity is-proven during his life, or they have
been recognized by him as his children; but such recognition must have been general
and notorious, or else in writing. Under such circumstances, if the recognition has been
mutual, the father may inherit from his illegitimate children." Iowa Code ( 1939),
§§ 12030, 12031.
2
I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 459 (first pub. 1756); ROLLISON, WILLS 64-68
(1939).
3
MAcKELDEY, RoMAN LAw, Dropsie trans., 502 (1883).
4 McGuire v. Brown, 41 Iowa 650 (1875); McKellar v. Harkins, 183 Iowa
1030, 166 N. W. 1061 (1918); Johnson v. Bodine, 108 Iowa 594, 79 N. W. 348
( 1899). In these cases the child was able to take from its illegitimate mother's ancestors as her representative. That representation was the basis of the decisions is shown
by the fact that in McKellar v. Harkins it was expressly left open whether the ancestor
could have inherited from the child through the child's illegitimate mother. In Johnson
v. Bodine the court expressed doubt as to the soundness of McGuire v. Brown, but
adhered to it because it was a rule of property. In the principal case, In re Clark's
Estate, the court referred to these cases, and then said that if the child could inherit
from the ancestor through the illegitimate parent there was no reason why the ancestor
could not inherit from the child through its illegitimate parent. But the oppooite inter-
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open whether the child could inherit in all cases through an illegitimate parent,
or whether the ancestor could inherit through illegitimate offspring. The decision abrogates the common-law rule to the effect that illegitimate persons have
no inheritable blood. Under this construction any person can take through an
illegitimate person in the same manner as if he had been legitimate. In spite of
the fact that the statute is in derogation of the common law, the Iowa courts
justify a broad construction because the statute is remedial in its nature. 5 There
is one qualification in the statute as to inheritance by and from the putative
father. For the illegitimate child to take, paternity must be proved during the
life of the father, or the father must have recognized his child either in writing or
in some other general or notorious manner. Further, the recognition must have
been mutual in order for the father to take by inheritance from illegitimate
offspring. Therefore, in order for those claiming through B's father to take,
they had to prove mutual recognition. There was not much doubt that the
father had recognized the son generally and notoriously, since the evidence
showed that he had revealed the child's paternity to his wife and to others, and
had tried unsuccessfully to bring the child, as a very small infant, into his home.
The chief question was whether the recognition had been mutual, inasmuch as
the father had died when the son was only eleven years of age and up to that
time the son had never been told anything concerning his father. However, it
was held that recognition of the father even after his death was satisfaction of
the statute. 6
lames W. Deer
pretation was given in Estate of Sunderland, 60 Iowa 732, 13 N. W. 655 {1882), to
a foreign statute regarding the rights of inheritance of an adopted child. The statute
permitted the child to inherit from its parents, and the court refused to extend this
to permit the child to take through its adopted parent from an ancestor of the parent.
5
Another case giving remedial construction is James v. James, {Tex. Civ. App.
1923) 253 S. W. II12. Cases construing narrowly are: Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809,
22 S. E. 153 {1895); In re Estate of Wallace, 197 N. C. 334, 148 S. E. 456 (1929).
The policy behind remedial construction was stated in the principal case, 290 N. W. at
3 l : "Just why a person, begotten and born out of lawful wedlock, an innocent victim of
the indiscretion of his parents, should have received the odium of the church, state, and
all society, and have been denied the right to inherit property from any ancestor, not
even excepting his father and mother, is a matter which is difficult to understand, and
unnecessary to discuss. This court has characterized it as 'one of the reproaches of the
common law which has shocked the legislative and judicial conscience of the civilized
world.'" Again in McKellar v. Harkins, 183 Iowa 1030 at 1043, 166 N. W. 1061
(1918), the court said: "The illegitimate child is as innocent as the babe of Bethlehem. Yet the common law held its fiction as a shield over the guilty parent, and
frowned upon the guiltless child with the disdain of a Pharisee."
6 There was abundant evidence that later in life B had recognized that his father
was as alleged. B treated the legitimate children of his father as brothers, always introduced them as such, gave them jobs, sent them Christmas presents, and paid for their
funerals. He planned to be buried in the family lot. He often said that he must have
inherited his father's shrewd sense of trading. The Iowa rule is that the nature of the
recognition required under the statute depends upon the circumstances and conditions
of each case. Trier v. Singmaster, 184 Iowa 307, 167 N. W. 538 (1918); Blair v.
Howell, 68 Iowa 619, 28 N. W. 199 (1886); Morgan v. Strand, 133 Iowa 299,
II0 N. W. 596 (1907); In re Estate of Wise, 206 Iowa 939, 221 N. W. 567 (1928).

